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This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board
decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question
is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring com-
panies inﬂuences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved
in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We ﬁnd that non-executives on
the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more
(fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our ﬁndings suggest that the non-
executive labour market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad)
acquisitions.
Introduction
In the UK, over the past 25 years the board
of directors has been emphasized as one of the
most important instruments of corporate gover-
nance. Central to this has been an emphasis on
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the monitoring potential of non-executive direc-
tors, with successive governance codes stressing the
need for signiﬁcant non-executive participation on
boards.1 Consequently, a majority of board po-
sitions in large UK companies are now held by
non-executive directors. The expectation is that
non-executives are able to actively monitor the be-
haviour of management, ensuring that corporate
decisions are made in the interests of shareholders.
In parallel, researchers have sought to in-
vestigate the governance role of boards, in
particular seeking to ascertain whether greater
non-executive presence on boards is associated
with improved shareholder wealth. However,
there exists little consistent evidence that greater
non-executive participation is associated with
enhanced performance.2 The apparent absence of
a direct link between board composition and ﬁrm
1See Cadbury (1992), CombinedCodes (1999, 2003, 2006,
2008) andUKCorporate Governance Codes (2010, 2012,
2014, 2016).
2Bhagat and Black (2002) and Hermalin and Weis-
bach (2003) review research examining the relationship
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performance has encouraged researchers to pursue
other avenues to understand the value of board
governance. One such initiative has been research
seeking to understand the operation of the market
for directors. This research has its roots in the
work of Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983),
who argued that the labour market for directors
serves as an incentive mechanism for directors to
pursue shareholder wealth continuously in their
management and monitoring activities. A number
of US studies provide some support for the notion
that the market for directors seeks to differentiate
on the basis of directors’ prior performance
(Brochet and Srinivasan, 2014; Fich and Shiv-
dasani, 2007; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014; Kaplan
and Reishus, 1990; Yermack, 2004). However,
Harford and Schonlau (2013) and Davidoff,
Lund and Schonlau (2014) ﬁnd that director
performance does not appear to be an important
determinant of future board positions.
This study examineswhether the holding of non-
executive directorships by non-executives subse-
quent to their company making an acquisition is
sensitive to their company’s post-acquisition per-
formance. Focusing on the holding of director-
ships subsequent to acquisition is useful for two
reasons. First, acquisitions are one of the most im-
portant strategic decisions made by boards and
consequently represent a useful environment in
which to ascertain the quality of non-executive
decision-making and monitoring (Masulis, Wang
and Xie, 2007).3 Second, existing research high-
lights signiﬁcant variation in the performance
of acquiring companies, with a large proportion
experiencing weak post-acquisition performance
(Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Harford, Humphery-
Jenner and Powell, 2012). Therefore, from a share-
holder perspective, it is possible to assess the
wealth created (or destroyed) by an acquisition.
Consequently, our study undertakes a direct test of
whether the quality of non-executive monitoring
of director decision-making surrounding a speciﬁc
corporate event, with a likely substantial impact on
between outside directors and ﬁrm performance, while
Dalton and Dalton (2005) and Adams, Hermalin and
Weisbach (2010) are broader reviews of the governance
role of boards.
3While typically top executives and external advisors play
a key role in an acquisition decision, the UK governance
environment holds the whole board accountable and re-
cent governance developments focusmuch of that respon-
sibility on the non-executive board members.
the ﬁrm and its shareholders, has an impact on the
subsequent holding of non-executive directorships
by the non-executives involved.
This study focuses on the UK, as we believe
it has a number of distinguishing features that
make it an ideal laboratory to test the effective-
ness of non-executive monitoring and whether this
impacts on subsequent holding of non-executive
directorships. First, our study coincides with a
period of major reform in the structure of UK
boards, with a pronounced increase in the role
and responsibilities of non-executive directors
(Cadbury, 1992; Combined Codes, 1999, 2003,
2006, 2008; UK Corporate Governance Codes,
2010, 2012, 2014, 2016). Of particular relevance
to our study is the emergence over this period
of a clear distinction between the executive role
of management and the monitoring role of non-
executives and, hence, a greater emphasis on non-
executive responsibility to ensure that shareholder
interests are pursued continuously in corporate
decision-making.4
Second, in the UK, CEO–chair duality, that is a
single individual assuming the roles of both CEO
and chair of the board, has been discouraged by
successive corporate governance codes, as well as
by institutional investors. As a result, we observe
duality in only 15% of our sample, compared with
64% in the US sample used by Duru, Wang and
Zhao (2013), while Chhaochharia and Grindstein
(2007) report CEO–chair duality in 75% of S&P
500 ﬁrms in 2003. While it might be relatively easy
to adjust for duality if a minority of observations
are exhibiting it, making such an adjustment for
a sample dominated by duality, such as in the US
case, seems less straightforward.
Third, unlike the position in the USA, where
companies frequently use staggered boards to pre-
vent director change, in the UK there are no re-
strictions to hiring and ﬁring directors. This is im-
portant for studying the market for directors, as
4As highlighted by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos
(2002), in comparison with the USA, historically UK
boards were dominated by executive directors. For exam-
ple, in 1988 only 21 of the FTSE 500 ﬁrms had a major-
ity of non-executive directors, compared with 387 of the
Fortune 500 ﬁrms. Further, the median UK board com-
prised only 27% non-executives compared with 81% for
the median US board. The current study reports a mean
proportion of non-executives in acquiring ﬁrms of 44% in
1994, rising to over 68% by the end of our sample period
in 2010.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
The Market for Non-Executive Directors 3
it allows companies to make board changes in a
more liberalmarket environment. Even though not
all US-listed companies possess staggered boards,
a number of studies illustrate the presence of such
boards in a very signiﬁcant proportion of compa-
nies. For example, between 2002 and 2008, Duru,
Wang and Zhao (2013) report that 61% of their
sample possessed staggered boards (see also Jira-
porn, Chintrakarn and Kim, 2012; Rose, 2009).
The absence of impediments to hiring and ﬁring
UK board members provides us with the opportu-
nity to investigate the market for non-executive di-
rectors in a more market-orientated environment.5
Therefore, the move towards greater non-executive
monitoring, as well as the relative lack of CEO–
chair duality and the absence of staggered boards,
makes the UK a useful environment to test the im-
pact of acquisitions on the subsequent holding of
non-executive directorships.
Our study makes three major contributions
to existing research. First, the focus on non-
executive directors and the impact of acquisition
performance on their careers distinguishes our
study from that of Harford and Schonlau (2013),
who focus predominantly on US CEOs. This
is especially important in the context of UK
companies, since over the past 25 years there has
been a signiﬁcant enhancement of non-executives’
monitoring role and, consequently, they are under
increased pressure to ensure value-maximizing
decisions on behalf of shareholders. This then
implies that those non-executives perceived as
being good (bad) monitors are likely to have their
careers enhanced (penalized) in the non-executive
labour market. Our UK study provides an ideal
opportunity to capture this. Second, while Har-
ford and Schonlau (2013) follow directors for a
two-year period after the acquisition, we do so
for ﬁve years. This is important, as the ﬁnancial
impact of acquisitions on shareholder wealth is
unlikely to fully materialize within such a short
window (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Therefore,
by tracking acquirer performance and board
positions over a ﬁve-year period, we provide more
5The acquisition environment in the UK is less regulated
than in the USA (Armour and Skeel, 2007). Speciﬁcally,
UK ﬁrms are not permitted to use pre-takeover defensive
measures, while such takeover impediments are common-
place in the USA. As shown by, for example, Masulis,
Wang and Xie (2007), such anti-takeover provisions sig-
niﬁcantly distort the wealth implications of US takeovers.
comprehensive insights into how the non-executive
labour market works. Third, we extend the range
of performance measures used in prior work by
including dividends as a performance measure.
We follow Kaplan and Reishus (1990), who use
dividend changes to measure performance in a
sample of US ﬁrms and ﬁnd that dividend cuts
have a negative impact on the subsequent holding
of board seats by those executives. As highlighted
by Easterbrook (1984), La Porta et al. (2000),
Rozeff (1982) and Sharma (2011), amongst others,
shareholders value regular dividends not only
because they are a mechanism for returning cor-
porate earnings to investors but also because, by
paying regular dividends, companies are forced to
return to the capital markets if they require funds.
This, in turn, allows investors to exercise some
control over directors regarding the management
of the company and, of particular relevance to this
study, the quality of non-executive monitoring of
that management. In this respect, any omission
or reduction in dividends post-acquisition can be
viewed as a negative outcome for shareholders
and is expected to lead to the punishment of
the non-executives concerned. Indeed, Sharma
(2011) ﬁnds that non-executive tenure is sensitive
to the continuation of dividends being paid and
attributes this to recognition by non-executives of
the value to shareholders of maintaining dividend
payments.
To answer our research question, we identify
successful acquisitions in the UK between 1994
and 2010, as well as the individuals holding
non-executive positions on the acquirers’ boards
on completion of the acquisition. We track the
number of non-executive directorships held by
each of the individual non-executives for up to
ﬁve years after the acquisition. We then measure
the accounting and market-based performance,
as well as the dividend changes of the acquiring
ﬁrms over the same ﬁve years, and investigate
whether the subsequent holding of non-executive
directorships is sensitive to post-acquisition per-
formance. Hence, our research period effectively
ends in 2015. We ﬁnd that the subsequent holding
of non-executive directorships by non-executives
is sensitive to the post-acquisition performance
of acquirers when this is measured by dividend
changes. We consistently ﬁnd that non-executives
on the boards of acquirers that omit or cut their
dividend hold fewer non-executive directorships
in listed companies than their counterparts on the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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boards of acquirers that increased their dividends,
up to ﬁve years after completion of the acquisition.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next sec-
tion reviews existing research on the market for di-
rectors and develops our hypothesis. The third sec-
tion describes the sample, variables, and research
methodology. Our empirical analysis is presented
in the fourth section. The ﬁfth section performs
a number of further and robustness tests and our
conclusions are presented in section six.
A review of the evidence on the market
for directors
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue
that the market for directors serves as an incentive
mechanism for directors to pursue shareholder
wealth in their management and monitoring
activities. A key question addressed in existing
research is whether there is a reputation effect in
the market for directors, whereby those directors
perceived as being good (bad) are rewarded (pe-
nalized) with additional (fewer) board positions.
Some of the earliest insights into the operation of
a market for directors have emerged from studies
focusing on the link between ﬁrm performance
and the holding of outside directorships by
CEOs. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) show
that the probability of retired CEOs holding
non-executive appointments in other ﬁrms is
positively related to their performance as CEOs,
while Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003)
ﬁnd that the prior performance of a CEO’s ﬁrm
has a positive inﬂuence on the number of outside
directorships the CEO holds. Similarly, looking
at executives more broadly, Kaplan and Reishus
(1990) provide evidence that executives in ﬁrms
that reduce dividends hold fewer non-executive
positions three years afterwards. This evidence
is broadly consistent with a market for directors
where past performance determines the demand
for executives to serve as non-executives elsewhere.
In terms of non-executives, the existing evi-
dence suggests that the quality of their monitoring
inﬂuences the likelihood and number of other
board seats they hold. Farrell and Whidbee (2000)
ﬁnd that directors who remove underperforming
CEOs are rewarded with additional directorships.
Yermack (2004) reports a positive link between
the performance of companies and the number of
outside directorships subsequently held by outside
directors. Similarly, Fich and Shivdasani (2007)
ﬁnd that outside directors of ﬁrms subject to
ﬁnancial fraud lawsuits are subsequently punished
in the labour market by holding fewer board
seats. Overall, this evidence is consistent with
non-executives being subject to an active market
for their services, with additional appointments
being inﬂuenced by their past performance as
non-executives. However, in a study of the impact
of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis on the subsequent
careers of outside directors in ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
Davidoff, Lund and Schonlau (2014) ﬁnd no
evidence that the directors’ subsequent careers
were affected by poor performance.
Researchers have often focused on corporate
acquisitions, since this is one area where the in-
terests of management and shareholders are likely
to diverge and, consequently, provides a useful
laboratory where the quality of non-executive
monitoring may be observed (see e.g. Masulis,
Wang and Xie, 2007). Consequently, a number
of studies have investigated the impact of non-
executive and CEO behaviour in the context of
acquisitions on their subsequent holding of non-
executive directorships. For example, Harford
(2003) reports that non-executives in poorly
performing ﬁrms that reject takeover bids are
subsequently punished by holding fewer board
seats, but those facilitating such takeovers are not
similarly penalized. Fairchild and Li (2005) ﬁnd
that directors on the boards of above-average-
performing takeover targets hold more board seats
subsequent to the takeover. Fos and Tsoutsoura
(2014) ﬁnd that directors on boards of ﬁrms
subject to a proxy contest are more likely to lose
directorships subsequently. Harford and Schonlau
(2013) add to this line of enquiry by focusing on
the impact of acquisition performance on the sub-
sequent careers of CEOs. However, their ﬁndings
suggest that the post-acquisition performance
of the acquirers, as measured by market-based
and accounting performance, does not impact
the number of board seats subsequently held by
CEOs, but the latter is heavily inﬂuenced by a
CEO’s acquisition experience. These results are in-
consistent with the notion that the labour market
rewards the quality of prior decision-making.
Our study also uses acquisitions to provide
insights into the labour market for directors. How-
ever, unlike Harford (2003) who studies (potential)
takeover targets, we focus on the performance of
non-executives in acquiring ﬁrms. Focusing on
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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acquirers helps us to study the operation of the
market for directors for at least three reasons.
First, the acquisition of another ﬁrm represents
a discrete event, making robust before and after
performance comparisons possible. Second, ac-
quisitions are one of the most important strategic
decisions made by boards and hence represent a
useful context in which to ascertain the quality
of director monitoring and decision-making
(Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2012;
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). Third, a vast
literature has investigated the post-acquisition
performance of acquirers, with mixed ﬁndings re-
garding the gains to shareholders from such trans-
actions (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Tuch and
O’Sullivan, 2007). Hence, acquisition decisions
are an ideal context in which to ascertain whether
board members involved in these decisions are
rewarded or punished for their impact on share-
holder wealth. By undertaking a comparison of
the number of non-executive directorships held by
the non-executives involved in an acquisition deci-
sion in the years after the acquisition is completed,
and relating this to the subsequent performance
of the acquirer over a similar time period, we can
ascertain how the quality of acquisition decisions
inﬂuences non-executives’ subsequent careers.
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: The number of non-executive directorships
held by a non-executive after an acquisition is
sensitive to the post-acquisition performance of
the acquiring ﬁrm.
Sample selection and methodology
Sample selection
Our reference point in time is year 0, which is the
year the acquisition was completed. We obtain the
list of UK acquisitions completed by non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms between 1 January 1994 and 31 Decem-
ber 2010 from Thomson One Banker.6 There are
6We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the analysis and request
that the target market value four weeks prior to the an-
nouncement of the acquisition is at least $10 million and
the acquirer owns 100% of the target after the acquisition.
Further analysis suggests that 55 offers are withdrawn
during our research period if we replace the requirement
of owning 100% of the target after the acquisition with
the requirement that the acquirer seeks to purchase at
least 50% of the target. These offers would be of inter-
est in the context of this research only if the decision to
240 acquisitions carried out by 203 acquirers dur-
ing that period. Since we require data on ﬁrm per-
formance for the ﬁve years after the acquisition,
the period of study effectively ends in 2015. Data
on individual non-executive directors is collected
from various editions of the Corporate Register,
which is published quarterly. Given the study’s fo-
cus on the acquirer’s performance subsequent to
the acquisition decision, and its impact on the
non-executives’ careers, we expect that any conse-
quences (or rewards) arising from the subsequent
quality of such acquisitions are dealt out to those
in post when the acquisition is completed. There-
fore, our sample comprises those non-executives
on the board of the acquirer when the acquisition
is completed.7 We then track the number of non-
executive directorships in listed ﬁrms held by each
of these individual non-executives for up to ﬁve
years after completion of the acquisition.8
The Corporate Register enables us to trace all
the non-executives for 158 acquirers engaged in
187 acquisitions from the initial sample of 203 ac-
quirers and 240 acquisitions. We identify 678 non-
executives on the boards of these 158 acquirers in
the quarter when the acquisition is completed. As
only eight acquirers are listed on the alternative in-
vestment market (AIM), we exclude these ﬁrms. A
further four acquirers (equating to eight acquisi-
tions) are dropped because they were involved in
withdraw the offer is driven by the bidder and, in particu-
lar, by the non-executive directors on the board of the bid-
der. A search of the newswires and press in the UK, using
the ABI/INFORMGlobal database, shows that only two
out of these 55 offers were withdrawn by the bidders on
the grounds that the ‘deal is no longer in the interests of
shareholders’.
7Our results are upheld when using the sample of non-
executives on the board of the acquirer in the year before
the completion of the acquisition.
8The deﬁnition of directorships does not include director-
ships in not-for-proﬁt entities and private companies for
the following reasons. First, it is difficult to ﬁnd data on
not-for-proﬁt entities. Second, private companies do not
normally distinguish between non-executive and execu-
tive directors. Third, ﬁrms listed on the London Stock Ex-
change have to comply with the various corporate gover-
nance codes (or explain their failure to comply), whereas
private companies do not have to comply or explain. This
would substantially reduce the demand for non-executives
by private companies. Finally, many of the private com-
panies may simply be subsidiaries of listed companies.
Hence, there is a danger that by expanding the sample to
non-executive directorships in private companies, we may
introduce a bias in the data which would be a function of
the organizational structure of companies.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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two acquisitions each in the same year.9 Fourteen
directors switched from a non-executive position
to an executive position sometime after year 0, and
are therefore excluded from the sample. The ﬁnal
sample comprises 646 non-executives sitting on the
boards of 156 acquirers involved in 183 successful
acquisitions. Given that some directors participate
in more than one acquisition, the total number
of observations in the ﬁnal sample is 771, related
to non-executives involved in 183 acquisitions.
Performance data are sourced from Datastream.
Methodology and deﬁnition of the variables
We test the validity of our hypothesis that the num-
ber of non-executive directorships held by a non-
executive is sensitive to the post-acquisition perfor-
mance of the acquiring ﬁrm as follows.We focus on
year 5, as the typical tenure in the UK for board
members is three years and a ﬁve-year period in-
cludes at least one incidence of reappointment of
the non-executive and/or the chance of a new ap-
pointment onto another company’s board. Focus-
ing on year 5 also makes sense, as the extant litera-
ture suggests that taking a longer post-acquisition
perspective provides a better assessment of the per-
formance of acquirers.10 We proceed by using neg-
ative binomial regressions estimating the number
of non-executive directorships held by the non-
executives in year 5. We formally test whether a
Poisson or a negative binomial model better suits
our data using a likelihood-ratio test for over-
dispersion. The test results reported inTables 5 and
6 later suggest that the dispersion parameter alpha
is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level
in all the regressions. This suggests that a negative
binomial model better suits our data.
All the regressions include the number of non-
executive directorships held by the non-executive
in the year before completion of the acquisition,
non-executive characteristics, as well as CEO, ac-
quirer and acquisition characteristics as control
9We include repeat acquisitions by the same acquirer as
long as these repeat acquisitions occur in different years.
Of the remaining 155 acquirers, 18 were involved in two
acquisitions and another three acquirers were involved in
three acquisitions in different years.
10A review of the literature by Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007)
suggests that, although there is no standard period of time
to assess the success or otherwise of an acquisition, most
of the studies in the ﬁeld measure the performance of the
acquirer ﬁve years after the acquisition.
variables.11 Table A.1 in the Appendix contains the
deﬁnitions of all the variables.
We use two market-based performance mea-
sures (i.e. ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT and
FIVE-YEAR CAR), two dividend change mea-
sures (i.e. DIVIDEND INCREASES and DIVI-
DEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS), as well as three
different measures of accounting performance (i.e.
ROA,ROE andCASH FLOW/TOTALASSETS).
All the accounting performance measures are in-
dustry adjusted by subtracting from each annual
observation the mean industry performance us-
ing the three-digit SIC codes.12 Unless otherwise
stated, all performance measures are based on
years 1 to 5 and are in the form of two dummy
variables, indicating good and bad acquisition per-
formance, respectively. The good (bad) acquisition
performance dummy is set to one if the average of
the acquirer’s performance from years 1 to 5 is pos-
itive (negative), and zero otherwise.13
Empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the distribution across time (Panel
A) and across industries (Panel B) of the 183 ac-
quisitions. Panel A shows that, similar to extant
studies (see e.g.Martynova andRenneboog, 2006),
there is a peak in acquisition activity between 1997
and 2000. Panel B shows that roughly 31% of the
acquirers are from the Other Industries: most of
11We control for the number of non-executive director-
ships held by the non-executives in the year before the
completion of the acquisition in order to allow for poten-
tial persistency in the data.We do not consider acquisition
proposals stalled by the non-executives, as most of these
are likely to be dealt with on a purely internal basis. Nev-
ertheless, we partly alleviate this limitation by controlling
for CEO characteristics, which are likely to be negatively
related to the likelihood of acquisition proposals being
stalled by the non-executives.
12As discussed in the robustness section, our results are
upheld when using the industry-adjusted dividend payout
as an alternative measure of performance.
13We use dichotomous measures of performance instead
of continuous measures for the following three reasons.
First, this allows for a neater test of our hypothesis
by clearly distinguishing between value-destroying and
value-creating acquisitions. Second, this approach ‘soft-
ens’ the impact of outliers. This is particularly important
as three of our performance measures are based on ac-
counting numbers. Finally, this approach is in line with
previous research (e.g. Harford and Schonlau, 2013).
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Annual and industry distribution of the acquisitions
Panel A. Annual distribution of acquisitions, acquirers and non-executives
Acquisitions
N % Acquirers Non-executives
1994 9 4.9 9 24
1995 12 6.6 11 54
1996 8 4.4 7 29
1997 18 9.8 14 54
1998 20 10.9 20 59
1999 36 19.7 32 101
2000 24 13.1 19 86
2001 10 5.5 9 42
2002 6 3.3 5 19
2003 7 3.8 6 31
2004 5 2.7 4 24
2005 9 4.9 7 34
2006 8 4.4 7 43
2007 5 2.7 4 21
2008 2 1.1 1 8
2009 1 0.6 0 5
2010 3 1.6 1 12
Total 183 100.0 156 646
Panel B. Industry distribution of the acquirers using the Fama and French classiﬁcation
Industry Acquirers %
1. Consumer non-durables 18 11.5
2. Consumer durables 3 1.9
3. Manufacturing 20 12.8
4. Oil, gas and coal extraction and products 3 1.9
5. Business equipment 12 7.7
6. Telephone and television transmission 4 2.6
7. Wholesale, retail and some services 37 23.7
8. Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs 6 3.9
9. Utilities 4 2.6
10. Other 49 31.4
Total 156 100.0
Panel A reports the distribution across time, whereas Panel B reports the distribution across industries of the 183 acquisitions and the
646 non-executives. Six out of the 49 acquirers in the ‘Other’ industries in Panel B belong to operators of non-residential buildings (real
estate) (code 651), another six to business services (code 874) and four to residential construction (code 152). The rest of the acquirers
in the ‘Other’ industries belong to 25 industries with three or less acquirers each. The numbers reported in the last two columns of
Panel A and Panel B are based on the ﬁrst acquisition completed by the acquirers and non-executives, respectively.
these ﬁrms are operators of non-residential build-
ings, real-estate investment trusts (REITs) and wa-
ter transportation services. The secondmost repre-
sented industry is the wholesale and retail industry,
with just under 24% of the acquisitions.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the ac-
quirers and acquisitions in Panel A, their non-
executives in Panel B and their CEOs in Panel C for
year 0, whereas Panel D compares the proportion
of acquirers with good and bad acquisition perfor-
mance from years 1 to 5. Some of the acquirers are
very large (Panel A); the average market value of
the acquirers is £2.344 billion, while the median
value is only £0.453 billion. The average percentage
of equity held by institutional investors is roughly
24%, and about half of the board is comprised
of non-executive directors. The industry-adjusted
DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIO is high, with an av-
erage of roughly 110%, but a median of only
10.7%. The mean (median) RELATIVE SIZE of
the acquisition is 35.4% (22.1%). The proportion
of acquisitions by cash and equity is 14% and
18%, respectively, with about 16% of the acqui-
sitions being followed by divestment. As for the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the 156 acquirers and 646 non-executives
Mean S.D. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Panel A. Acquirer and acquisition characteristics
Market value (£m) 2,344 7,656 18 167 453 1,547 77,043
Total assets (£m) 3,227 13,700 39 208 568 2,007 162,000
Institutional ownership 0.237 0.170 0.000 0.108 0.217 0.335 0.781
Proportion of non-executives on the board 0.493 0.129 0.167 0.400 0.500 0.571 0.800
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.102 7.220 −3.546 −0.179 0.107 0.366 62.547
Relative size 0.354 0.386 0.001 0.086 0.221 0.542 2.514
Premium 33.419 28.331 −98.030 15.050 33.110 46.070 135.630
Cash dummy 0.142 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Stock dummy 0.180 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Divestment dummy 0.158 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel B. Non-executive characteristics
Non-executive tenure (years) 4.897 4.941 0.008 1.581 3.441 6.408 28.394
Non-executive age (years) 59.115 7.356 35.584 54.085 59.896 64.430 80.430
Non-executive age dummy 0.492 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Non-executive ownership 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125
Chair dummy 0.121 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel C. CEO characteristics
CEO ownership 0.015 0.045 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.355
Duality 0.131 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel D. Acquirers’ performance
Good acq. perf. (= 1) Bad acq. perf. (= 0) Differences in proportions (z-test)
Announcement effect 0.397 0.577 −3.171***
Five-year CAR 0.423 0.474 −0.911
Dividend increases 0.417 0.583 −2.944***
Dividend cuts or omissions 0.493 0.506 0.227
ROA 0.718 0.218 8.850***
ROE 0.526 0.410 2.042**
Cash ﬂow/total assets 0.635 0.237 7.079***
This table provides summary statistics for acquirers, acquisitions, non-executive and CEO characteristics for the year of the completion
of the acquisition (year 0), except for Panel D, which compares the proportion of acquirers with good and bad performance from year
1 to year 5. ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on equity) and CASH FLOW/TOTAL ASSETS dummies are based on the average
of the acquirer’s performance over years 1 to 5. If the average is positive, the good acquisition performance dummy is set to one, and
zero otherwise. The bad acquisition performance dummy is set to one if the average is negative, and zero otherwise. The DIVIDEND
INCREASES dummy equals one if there has been at least one increase in dividends with no cuts or omissions between year 1 and
year 5, and zero otherwise. The DIVIDEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS dummy is set to one if there is at least one dividend cut or
omission between year 1 and year 5, and zero otherwise. The good acquisition performance dummies for the ANNOUNCEMENT
EFFECT and FIVE-YEAR CAR are set to one if the cumulative abnormal returns for day −1 to +1 and month 1 to 60, respectively,
are positive, and zero otherwise. The bad acquisition performance dummies for the ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT and FIVE-YEAR
CAR are the equivalent dummies for negative cumulative abnormal returns. The equivalent two percentages do not add to 100% as for
a small number of acquirers the return data required to calculate the respective abnormal returns is not available. All the accounting
performance measures and DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIO are industry-adjusted. Differences in proportions in Panel D are assessed
using a proportion test. The remaining variables are deﬁned in Table A.1.
*, **, *** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
non-executives (Panel B), their TENURE with the
ﬁrm is on average around 5 years, while the me-
dian is 3.4 years; their average AGE is about 59
years, and 49% of the non-executives are 60 years
or older. Non-executives hold little or no equity
in their ﬁrms, although 79.2% of non-executives
in the sample (not tabulated) hold some equity.
12% of non-executives also chair their boards. As
for CEO characteristics (Panel C), average CEO
OWNERSHIP is 1.5%with amedian of only 0.1%,
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Number of directorships, age and year of departure from the market for the 646 non-executives
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
(Year 5–
Year 0)
Panel A. Number of non-executive directorships held by the non-executives according to age
Non-executive directorships held by all non-executives in the sample 1.99 1.79 1.61 1.42 1.25 1.05 −16.91***
Only non-executives still in the sample in year 5
under 60 in year 0 2.12 2.11 2.10 2.03 2.04 1.96 −1.76*
60 and over in year 0 2.69 2.44 2.23 2.12 1.96 1.69 −7.87***
Non-executive directorships in companies listed on the Official List
held by all non-executives in the sample
1.93 1.72 1.54 1.33 1.15 0.96 −18.98***
Only non-executives still in the sample in year 5
under 60 in year 0 2.07 2.02 1.98 1.92 1.88 1.80 −3.32***
60 and over in year 0 2.60 2.37 2.15 1.98 1.82 1.53 −8.61***
Non-executive directorships in AIM listed companies held by all
non-executives in the sample
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.73*
Only non-executives still in the sample in year 5
under 60 in year 0 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.16 2.86***
60 and over in year 0 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.16 1.84*
Panel B. Number and percentage of non-executives who exit the market for directors according to age
Left the sample — 65 109 170 221 280
% — 10.1 16.9 26.3 34.2 43.3
of which 60 and over — 42 71 109 151 179
% — 64.6 65.1 64.1 68.3 63.9
In the sample 646 581 537 476 425 366
% 100.0 89.9 83.1 73.7 65.8 56.7
of which 60 and over 318 276 247 209 167 139
% 49.2 47.5 46.0 43.9 39.3 37.9
Panel A reports the average number of non-executive directorships for all the 646 non-executives for the year in which the acquisition
was completed and the subsequent ﬁve years. The panel also reports the equivalent number of non-executive directorships in companies
listed on the Official List and those listed on AIM. These numbers are also reported separately by age for those non-executives that
remain in the sample until year 5. A non-executive is considered to remain in the sample until year 5 if he/she has at least one non-
executive directorship on any ﬁrm’s board. A distinction is made between those non-executives that are 60 years or older in year 0
and those that are younger. The last column of Panel A reports the t-tests for the difference in means between year 5 and year 0.
Panel B reports the number and percentage of non-executives that leave the labour market for directors during the ﬁve years after the
acquisition. These numbers are cumulative. A non-executive is assumed to have left the market for directors if his/her non-executive
directorships fall to zero by year 5.
*, **, *** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
while approximately 13% of CEOs also chair their
boards.
In terms of performance (Panel D), 57.7% of
the acquirers experience a bad (i.e. negative) short-
term market reaction (ANNOUNCEMENT EF-
FECT), whereas only 39.7% of the acquirers have
a good (i.e. positive) short-term market reaction,
and this difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
proportion of acquirers with good acquisition per-
formance from years 1 to 5 is signiﬁcantly greater
across all three accounting performance measures
than the equivalent proportion of acquirers with
bad acquisition performance, and the difference is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better. In contrast,
the proportion of acquirers that cut or omit their
dividend in at least one of the ﬁve years following
the year of the acquisition is approximately half,
suggesting an equal distribution between good and
bad performers.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the evolution over
years 0 to 5 of the number of non-executive direc-
torships held by the 646 non-executives (i.e. those
that left the sample before year 5 and those that
did not). A non-executive is deemed to remain in
the sample until year 5 if he/she has at least one
non-executive directorship in any listed ﬁrm. The
panel also reports the number of non-executives
that were younger than 60 years in year 0, as well
as those that were older. The average number
of non-executive directorships held by the 646
non-executives is two in year 0. It drops to one in
year 5. While older non-executives tend to have on
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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average one additional non-executive directorship
in year 0, amounting to a total of roughly three
directorships, this number drops to less than two
directorships in year 5. This drop in directorships
is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In contrast, younger
non-executives experience little change over time
in this number.
Most non-executive directorships in year 0
(roughly 97%, not tabulated) are in ﬁrms that
are on the Official List. The trends in the num-
ber of non-executive directorships in such ﬁrms
are similar to those for the full sample. Further,
for the approximately 5% (not tabulated) of the
non-executives holding at least one non-executive
directorship in ﬁrms listed on the AIM in year
0, the number of non-executive directorships on
the board of these ﬁrms increases rather than de-
creases from years 0 to 5. This increase is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for younger
non-executives. This likely reﬂects the substantial
growth in the AIM during that period (Espenlaub,
Khurshed and Mohamed, 2012).
Panel B of Table 3 reports, for each of the
years 0 to 5, the number of non-executives who
no longer hold any non-executive directorships.14
The numbers are cumulative. There are 280 (i.e.
about 43% of the non-executives) no longer in the
labour market in year 5. Exits are particularly fre-
quent in years 3–5.While the vast majority of non-
executives who exit the labour market are older
than 60 years in year 0, the percentage of younger
non-executives who exit the labourmarket is never-
theless non-negligible, hovering at around a third.
This suggests that there is a driver other than age
and retirement behind this decline.
Univariate analysis
Table 4 shows no evidence that non-executives
with bad acquisition performance hold fewer non-
executive directorships in year 5. We ﬁnd that the
number of non-executive directorships held by the
non-executives decreases from years 0 to 5, regard-
less of the performance. As highlighted in the pre-
vious subsection, age plays an important role but
it is not the only driver explaining this decline.
14A search in LexisNexis shows that nine of the 646 non-
executives died within ﬁve years following the year of the
acquisition. Our results are upheld after excluding these
nine cases.
Regression analysis
Table 5 reports the negative binomial regressions,
which estimate the number of directorships held
by the non-executive in year 5.15 The independent
variables are the number of non-executive direc-
torships held in the year before the acquisition is
completed (i.e. year −1), performance dummies,
non-executive, CEO, acquirer and acquisition
characteristics.
Regressions (1) to (4) show that the good and
bad acquisition performance dummies based on
the ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT and FIVE-
YEAR CAR are insigniﬁcant.16 This suggests that
the short- and long-term market reaction to the
acquisition does not affect the number of non-
executive directorships held by the non-executives
in year 5. Regressions (5) and (6) measure perfor-
mance by DIVIDEND INCREASES and DIVI-
DEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS. The coefficient
on DIVIDEND INCREASES is positive and sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient
on DIVIDEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In contrast,
all the remaining performancemeasures used in re-
gressions (7) to (12) are insigniﬁcant. Hence, there
is no evidence that non-executives of acquirers
with badmarket or accounting-based performance
hold fewer non-executive directorships in year 5.
However, we ﬁnd strong support for our hypoth-
esis when performance is measured by dividend
changes. Based on the marginal effects, on average
the number of non-executive directorships held by
the non-executives in year 5 increases (decreases)
by 0.219 (0.216) units ifDIVIDEND INCREASES
(DIVIDEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS) switches
from0 to 1, with all the other variables in themodel
being held constant. This suggests that the number
of subsequent directorships held by non-executives
ﬁve years post-acquisition is neither explained by
the market nor the accounting performance mea-
sures, but is sensitive to dividend changes.
In terms of the control variables, the coefficient
on NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIPS mea-
sured in the year before the acquisition is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all the regres-
sions. This suggests persistency in the number
15The t-values for the coefficients are heteroscedasticity-
consistent and the standard errors are clustered by non-
executives.
16Similar results are obtained when using buy-and-hold
abnormal returns.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 4. Directorships held by the non-executives and performance dummies over the ﬁve years after the acquisition
Mean non-executive directorships in
Number of
observations Year 0 Year 5
t-values/
z-values
Announcement effect
Bad acq. perf. 371 2.119 1.073 −13.37***/−12.61***
Good acq. perf. 260 1.785 1.031 −9.90***/−9.47***
t-values/z-values 2.94***/2.76*** 0.39/0.20
Five-year CAR
Bad acq. perf. 299 2.067 1.077 −10.89***/−11.07***
Good acq. perf. 287 1.899 1.014 −11.91***/−10.46***
t-values/z-values 1.45/0.80 0.57/0.54
Dividend changes
Cuts or omissions 321 2.048 0.963 −13.46***/−11.93***
Increased dividends 283 1.912 1.134 −9.46***/−9.89***
t-values/z-values 1.17/1.25 −1.57/−1.25
ROA
Bad acq. perf. 142 1.951 1.099 −6.89***/−6.42***
Good acq. perf. 469 1.989 1.013 −15.70***/−14.61***
t-values/z-values −0.29/−0.02 0.68/0.50
ROE
Bad acq. perf. 247 2.012 1.040 −11.46***/−10.13***
Good acq. perf. 364 1.959 1.027 −12.62***/−12.21***
t-values/z-values 0.46/0.56 0.12/0.21
Cash ﬂow/total assets
Bad acq. perf. 156 2.006 1.064 −6.92***/−7.54***
Good acq. perf. 405 1.970 1.007 −15.46***/−13.26***
t-values/z-values 0.27/0.18 0.45/0.50
This table compares the change in directorships over the ﬁve years after the acquisition (year 5–year 0) for the 646 non-executives. The ta-
ble reports the results for six performance measures (i.e.ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT, FIVE-YEARCAR,DIVIDENDCHANGES,
ROA,ROE andCASH FLOW/TOTALASSETS).ROA,ROE andCASH FLOW/TOTALASSETS dummies are based on the average
of the acquirer’s performance between year 1 and year 5. If the average performance is positive, the good acquisition performance
dummy is set to one, and zero otherwise. The bad acquisition performance dummy is set to one if the average performance is negative,
and zero otherwise. The INCREASED DIVIDENDS dummy equals one if there has been at least one increase in dividends with no
cuts or omissions between year 1 and year 5. The CUTS OR OMISSIONS dummy equals one if there is at least one dividend cut
or omission between year 1 and year 5, and zero otherwise. The good acquisition performance dummies for the ANNOUNCEMENT
EFFECT and FIVE-YEARCAR are set to one if the cumulative abnormal returns for day−1 to+1 andmonth 1 to 60, respectively, are
positive, and zero otherwise. The negative dummies for the ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT and FIVE-YEAR CAR are the equivalent
dummies for negative CARs. All the accounting performance measures are industry-adjusted. Differences in means are assessed using
a t-test, whereas differences in medians are tested using a z-test (Wilcoxon sign-rank test). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test
the equality of medians for the unmatched data when good and bad acquisition performances are compared.
*, **, *** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
of directorships held by the non-executives. All
four non-executive characteristics (i.e. TENURE,
AGE DUMMY, CHAIR DUMMY and NON-
EXECUTIVE OWNERSHIP) are also signiﬁcant
in all regressions at the 10% level or better.17 The
17Untabulated regressions show that non-executive acqui-
sition experience, measured as the number of acquisitions
a non-executive has participated in since the beginning of
our sample period (i.e. 1994), up to and including year 0,
is insigniﬁcant in all the regressions and our main regres-
sion results are upheld. Focusing our analysis on those
non-executive directors involved in only one acquisition
does not alter our ﬁndings.
results suggest that non-executives with longer
tenure, those aged 60 and above, and those with
greater ownership in the acquirer hold fewer
directorships ﬁve years after the acquisition.
However, non-executives who also chair the
board hold more directorships in year 5. Finally,
none of the CEO, acquirer or acquisition char-
acteristics are consistently signiﬁcant across the
regressions.
To summarize, there is strong evidence that
non-executives with bad (good) acquisition per-
formance are punished (rewarded) by the labour
market via fewer (more) board seats in year 5, but
only when acquisition performance is measured
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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by dividend changes.18 Hence, our hypothesis is
validated.
Further and robustness tests
Further tests
First, we explain why the number of directorships
held by the non-executives is sensitive to dividend
changes but not to market and accounting perfor-
mance measures. Panel A of Table 6 reports the
logit regressions using DIVIDEND INCREASES
and DIVIDEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS, re-
spectively, as the dependent variable regressed on
CAR[−1,1] and CAR[1,60], the latter two in
the form of continuous measures of performance.
CAR[−1,1] is insigniﬁcant in both regressions,
whereas CAR[1,60] is positive (negative) and sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level (5% level) when using
DIVIDEND INCREASES (DIVIDEND CUTS
OROMISSIONS) as the dependent variable. This
shows that acquirers experiencing a positive (neg-
ative) long-termmarket reaction are more likely to
increase (cut or omit) dividends ﬁve years after the
acquisition. Further, Panel B shows that the pos-
itive long-term market reaction to the announce-
ment leads to higher EPS and DPS but not to
higherROA,ROE andCASHFLOW/TOTALAS-
SETS ﬁve years after the acquisition. Overall, this
suggests that dividends are a more tangible and
salient measure of performance post-acquisition,
as acquirers pay out the extra value created by
the acquisitions to their shareholders via increased
dividends. Negative long-termmarket reactions re-
sult in lower or omitted dividends ﬁve years after
the acquisition.
Second, to address endogeneity concerns, we re-
run the regressions using the subsample of ac-
quirers with a stable dividend policy prior to the
acquisition. Following Goergen, Renneboog and
Correia da Silva (2005), we deﬁne an acquirer as
having a stable dividend policy if the acquirer re-
ports positive dividends per share and earnings
per share for the four years prior to the acquisi-
tion. Further analysis (not tabulated) shows that
141 of the 183 acquisitions in the sample are pre-
ceded by four years of stable dividend policy. We
then rerun the regressions reported in Table 5 for
18Untabulated regressions show that our results are up-
held after excluding the 44 of the 183 acquisitions which
engaged in share repurchases in at least one year after the
acquisition.
the subsample of acquirers with a stable dividend
policy. The abridged negative binomial regressions
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 con-
ﬁrm that our main results are upheld when us-
ing DIVIDEND INCREASES and DIVIDEND
CUTSOROMISSIONS. Untabulated regressions
suggest that, similar to Table 5, all the market and
accounting-based performance measures are in-
signiﬁcant. Hence, our results are unlikely to be af-
fected by endogeneity, such as unstable dividends
pre-acquisition, which continue post-acquisition,
and suggest that non-executives are indeed re-
warded (penalized) for good (bad) acquisitions.
Finally, why does it make sense to use ﬁve years
of post-acquisition performance? Are the non-
executives rewarded (penalized) over shorter peri-
ods of time? The dependent variables in columns
(3)/(4), (5)/(6) and (7)/(8) of Table 7 are the number
of directorships held by the non-executive two,
three and four years post-acquisition, respectively.
The performance measures are also calculated for
the respective period. For example, the dummy
DIVIDEND INCREASES in column (3) equals
one if there has been at least one increase in
dividends with no cuts or omissions in years 1 and
2, and zero otherwise. The dummy DIVIDEND
CUTS OR OMISSIONS used in column (4) of
the same table equals one if there is at least one
dividend cut or omission in years 1 and 2, and
zero otherwise. For the two-year post-acquisition
performance, the dividend change dummies are
insigniﬁcant. However, we observe signiﬁcant
results when using the three-year and four-year
post-acquisition dividend change dummies. This
suggests that it takes up to three years for a
non-executive to be rewarded (penalized) with
additional (fewer) non-executive directorships.
Bearing in mind that non-executives in the UK are
typically up for (re-)election every three years, this
result makes perfect sense. Also, in the context
of an acquisition, a bad acquisition decision is
unlikely to have an immediate, detrimental effect
on performance, and the effect is more likely to be
gradual.
To summarize, there is strong evidence that di-
rectors are punished for dividend cuts or omissions
and rewarded for dividend increases, and this effect
is upheld for acquirers with a stable dividend pol-
icy prior to the acquisition. This suggests that our
results are driven by the non-executives’ acquisi-
tion decisions rather than performance outcomes
independent of acquisition decisions.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. Is the market reaction at the announcement of the acquisition reﬂected in the dividend policy ﬁve years after the acquisition?
Panel A. Logit regressions explaining the likelihood of increasing versus cutting or omitting dividends
Dividend
increases
Dividend
cuts or
omissions
Dividend
increases
Dividend
cuts or
omissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[−1,1] 0.420 −0.365
(0.33) (−0.28)
CAR[1,60] 0.325*** −0.298**
(2.68) (−2.44)
Constant −0.261* 0.011 −0.188 −0.063
(−1.72) (0.07) (−1.15) (−0.39)
Number of observations 177 177 165 165
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.028
Chi2 0.111 0.078 7.196 5.955
Panel B. Comparing performance measures between acquirers with a positive and negative long-term market reaction
Positive CAR[1,60] Negative CAR[1,60]
Mean Median Mean Median t-test/z-test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EPSY5 38.359 28.710 27.384 17.800 1.50/3.14***
DPSY5 15.245 11.500 10.385 6.450 1.62/2.51**
ROAY5 0.108 0.114 0.098 0.094 0.52/0.38
ROEY5 0.116 0.116 0.183 0.115 −0.25/0.57
Cash ﬂow/total assetsY5 0.067 0.077 0.072 0.067 −0.17/0.06
Industry-adjusted ROAY5 0.157 0.048 0.163 0.055 −0.06/−0.18
Industry-adjusted ROEY5 0.257 0.047 0.458 0.059 −0.42/−0.11
Industry-adjusted cash
Flow/total assetsY5
0.382 0.033 0.142 0.050 0.78/−0.07
Average industry-adjusted
ROAY1 to Y5
0.115 0.035 0.114 0.039 0.01/−0.50
Average industry-adjusted
ROEY1 to Y5
0.028 0.022 0.181 0.055 0.76/0.16
Average industry-adjusted
Cash ﬂow/total
assetsY1 to Y5
−0.042 0.023 0.017 0.031 −0.36/−0.25
Panel A reports the logit estimates of the likelihood of the acquirer increasing (cutting or omitting dividends) ﬁve years after the acqui-
sition for the 183 acquisitions. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the DIVIDEND INCREASES dummy, which equals
one if there has been at least one increase in dividends with no cuts or omissions between year 1 and year 5, and zero otherwise. The
dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is theDIVIDEND CUTS OR OMISSIONS dummy, which equals one if there is at least one
dividend cut or omission between year 1 and year 5, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are the short-term (i.e.CAR[−1,1])
and long-term (i.e. CAR[1,60]) market reaction to the announcement of the acquisitions, both measured as continuous performance
measures. CAR[−1,1] is based on daily data and the CAPM model, where day 0 is the day of the acquisition announcement. The pa-
rameters of the CAPMmodel are estimated over the period covering day −290 to day −40. CAR[1,60] is based on monthly data and
the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model, where month 0 is the month of the acquisition announcement. The
parameters of the four-factor model are estimated over the period ranging frommonth−66 to month−6. Panel B compares the means
and medians of performance measures between acquirers with positive and negative long-term market reactions. EPS (earnings per
share),DPS (dividends per share), ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on equity) and CASH FLOW/TOTAL ASSETS are measured
in year 5, unless otherwise speciﬁed. The remaining variables are deﬁned in Table A.1. Differences in means are assessed using a t-test,
whereas differences in medians are tested using a z-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum).
*, **, *** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Quality rather than quantity of non-executive
directorships held
It may be that non-executives are not rewarded
in the form of an increase in the quantity of
non-executive directorships, but rather in the form
of better-quality directorships. Better-quality di-
rectorships may manifest themselves in three dif-
ferent ways. First, non-executive directorships in
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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FTSE 100 ﬁrmsmay bemore prestigious than non-
executive directorships in smaller ﬁrms. Second, a
similar case can be made for non-executive direc-
torships in ﬁrms that are part of the Official List
compared with those on the AIM. Finally, non-
executives may be rewarded with chair positions
rather than regular non-executive directorships.
Using the 296 non-executives who are still in the
labourmarket in year 5, and are involved with only
one acquisition during the period of study, we run
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the
change in the proportion of directorships in FTSE
100, AIM and chair positions from years 0 to 5 is
the dependent variable. The regression results (not
tabulated) show that post-acquisition performance
has no consistent impact on the change in the pro-
portion of higher-quality board seats held by the
non-executives. Hence, our results are upheld.
Compensation of directors and acquirers’
post-acquisition performance
Next we use the cash compensation of non-
executives as an alternative reward mechanism.19
The average cash compensation of individual non-
executives measured in year 0 is used as an ex-
planatory variable and their respective average in-
dividual cash compensation in year 5 is used as
an alternative dependent variable to the number
of directorships.20 However, this regression speci-
ﬁcation suffers from selection bias, since a director
who is no longer in the labour market in year 5 will
have zero compensation in that year. To address
this issue, we use a Heckman selection procedure
where the ﬁrst-step equation is a logit regression
19Director compensation is obtained from BoardEx,
which provides comprehensive compensation data start-
ing with 1999. Hence, we focus on the 116 of the 183
acquisitions in the sample completed between January
1999 and December 2010 and the 426 non-executives in-
volved in these acquisitions. As some directors participate
in more than one acquisition, the total number of obser-
vations in the remuneration sample is 525. Cash compen-
sation is deﬁned as the base salary plus bonus. Only 11
of the 426 non-executives (not tabulated) with available
remuneration data receive equity-based compensation in
year 0 and also year 5. As equity-based compensation for
non-executives has been consistently discouraged by the
UK corporate governance codes, this low number is not
surprising. The analysis in this section is based on the cash
compensation only.
20Average cash compensation is used instead of cash com-
pensation to control for the number of directorships held
by the director.
explaining the likelihood of the director participat-
ing in the labour market until year 5. The second-
step OLS regressions use the natural logarithm of
one plus the average cash compensation of indi-
vidual non-executives in year 5 as the dependent
variable and the Mill’s ratio, performance, non-
executive characteristics, CEO, acquirer and ac-
quisition characteristics as independent variables.
All the regressions also include the natural loga-
rithm of one plus the average cash compensation
of the non-executive in year 0 on the right-hand
side. We ﬁnd that the acquirer’s performance post-
acquisition does not have an impact on the average
cash compensation of the non-executives in year 5
(not tabulated). Similar results are obtained when
we use total compensation, which is the sum of the
cash and equity-based compensation.
Alternative performance measures
The following four alternative types of perfor-
mance measures are used. First, we use the average
for years 1 to 5 for the accounting measures of
performance and the actual (continuous) values
for the market-based measures of performance
instead of the acquisition performance dummies.
Second, following Martin and Shalev (2017), the
differences in the post- and pre-acquisition perfor-
mance of the acquirer are used instead of the ac-
quisition dummies. For example, forROA, this dif-
ference is calculated as ROA in year 5 minus ROA
in year −1. Given that we are interested in seg-
regating the impact of good and bad acquisition
decisions, we interact the change in the continuous
performance measures of the acquirer (i.e. ROAY5
minus ROAY−1) with NEGATIVE DUMMY,
which equals one if the change in ROA is negative,
and zero otherwise.Hence, the interaction termbe-
tween the change in performance andNEGATIVE
DUMMY captures the impact of bad acquisition
decisions only. We then include the change in
the performance measures and their respective
interaction terms with NEGATIVE DUMMY
in the negative binomial regressions reported in
Table 5. These results are tabulated in columns (9)
to (12) of Table 7. Third, we measure performance
using good and bad dividend payout dummy vari-
ables, which are set to one if the average industry-
adjusted dividend payout ratio for years 1 to 5 is
positive and negative, respectively, and zero oth-
erwise. The industry adjustment is done for each
annual observation by subtracting the industry
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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mean dividend payout ratio based on the three-
digit SIC codes. Finally, we base ANNOUNCE-
MENT EFFECT on various alternative win-
dows (i.e. [−1,0], [0,+1], [−2,+2], [0,+20] and
[−20,+20]), where again day 0 is the day of the
acquisition announcement. Our results are robust
to the above alternative types of performance
measures. Performance is signiﬁcant only when it
is based on dividends.
Alternative estimation techniques and subsample
analysis
Our results are also robust when using the fol-
lowing three alternative estimation techniques.
First, we categorize the changes in the number of
non-executive directorships from years 0 to 5 for
each non-executive into decreases, no changes and
increases. We run an ordered logit regression using
this ordinal variable as the dependent variable
and the number of directorships in year −1, the
acquisition performance dummies, non-executive,
CEO, acquirer and acquisition characteristics
as the independent variables. Second, we use
logit regressions to estimate the likelihood that
a non-executive no longer holds non-executive
directorships in year 5. Third, we rerun our main
model using OLS and the change in the number of
directorships (i.e. directorships held in year 5 mi-
nus directorships held in year 0) as the dependent
variable. Our results are upheld.
Further, given that performance is measured
over a ﬁve-year period, to avoid any contamina-
tion effects, we rerun the analysis using the sub-
sample of acquirers that participated in one acqui-
sition only during the period of the study. We have
also identiﬁed that 14 of the 156 acquirers in the
sample do not pay any dividends from years −5
to −1. We rerun our analysis on the subsample
of observations after excluding the 54 out of 771
observations in the sample associated with these
14 acquirers. Our results are upheld.
Corporate governance reforms
Corporate governance reforms, speciﬁcally the
Higgs (2003) recommendation that 50% of the
board should be comprised of non-executives, may
have exogenously increased the number of non-
executive directorships held by the non-executives.
Hence, we rerun the regressions in Table 5
separately for the pre- and post-2003 periods. Our
results remain when we control for the potential
impact of the Higgs recommendations.
Conclusion and discussion
Over the past two decades, the quality of board
governance has become a key component of the
UK corporate governance architecture. In partic-
ular, as a result of successive corporate governance
codes, there has emerged a sharper distinction
between the monitoring role of non-executives
and the management role of executives. Central
to these developments is a desire to ensure that
non-executives are able to monitor management
behaviour and corporate decisions are made in the
interests of shareholders. Underlying this revised
emphasis on the role of boards is a belief that a
market exists for the services of non-executives
and, as a result, better-quality non-executives
are expected to be rewarded with further non-
executive appointments as other ﬁrms seek to
capture their expertise for their own boards.
Similarly, those non-executives perceived as being
inadequate advocates of shareholder welfare are
expected to encounter a reduced demand for their
services from other ﬁrms.
This study examines the efficiency of the labour
market for non-executives by investigatingwhether
the post-acquisition performance of acquirers in-
ﬂuences the number of non-executive directorships
that non-executives involved in these acquisition
decisions hold up to ﬁve years after the acqui-
sition. Our analysis consistently reveals that the
subsequent holding of non-executive directorships
by non-executives is sensitive to post-acquisition
performance when measured by dividend changes
but not market and accounting performance mea-
sures. These ﬁndings contribute to our knowledge
of the non-executive labour market for several
reasons. First, our ﬁndings suggest that the UK
labour market for non-executives is efficient and
rewards as well as punishes non-executives for
the quality of their acquisition decisions. Second,
the link between dividends and the subsequent
holding of non-executive directorships identiﬁes
the key role dividends have in investors’ percep-
tions of non-executive performance. We show
that dividends are a more tangible and salient
measure of performance compared with market
and accounting performance measures, because
acquirers pay out the extra value created by the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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acquisitions to their shareholders via increased
dividends. Bad acquisition decisions, which are as-
sociated with negative long-termmarket reactions,
end in lower or omitted dividends ﬁve years after
the acquisition. Finally, we show that a bad acqui-
sition decision is unlikely to have an immediate,
detrimental effect on performance as its effect on a
non-executive’s career is gradual. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that investigates
the impact of the quality of a decision taken by a
non-executive director on his/her future career in
the context of acquisitions using dividend changes
as a measure of post-acquisition performance. Our
study complements that of Kaplan and Reishus
(1990), who ﬁnd that the careers of top executives
are negatively affected by dividend cuts in general
(i.e. not in the context of acquisitions). We show
that, in the case of the non-executives on the board
of the acquirers, investors view dividend changes
as the result of good (or bad) acquisition decisions.
Why do we ﬁnd that dividends affect the fu-
ture careers of the non-executive directors whereas
other performance measures do not have an ef-
fect? First, dividends are more tangible for most
investors. They are cash in hand and certain in-
vestors (e.g. pension funds) may rely on dividends
to meet their own liabilities. This is consistent with
Bhattacharya’s (1979: 260) ‘[t]he old “bird in the
hand” arguments that agents have to realise their
wealth for consumption and that, somehow, divi-
dends are “superior” to capital gains for this pur-
pose [ . . . ]’. Second, dividends are a more salient
measure of performance thanmarket and account-
ing measures of performance. More speciﬁcally,
Lintner (1956) found that managers are reluctant
to change dividends, unless the change is war-
ranted by a permanent change in earnings. Fi-
nally, as highlighted by Easterbrook (1984), La
Porta et al. (2000) and Sharma (2011), amongst
others, shareholders value regular dividends not
only because they are a mechanism for returning
corporate earnings to investors, but also because
by paying regular dividends companies are forced
to return to the capital markets if they require
funds. This, in turn, allows investors to have some
oversight of directors regarding the management
of the company and the quality of non-executive
monitoring of that management. Indeed, Sharma
(2011) ﬁnds that non-executive tenure is sensitive
to the continuation of dividends being paid and
attributes this to recognition by non-executives
of the value to shareholders of maintaining divi-
dend payments. Therefore, we believe that dividend
changes must be taken into account when explor-
ing the impact of post-acquisition performance on
the future careers of non-executive directors.
Appendix
Table A.1. Deﬁnitions of variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Number of directorships Number of non-executive directorships held by an individual non-executive ﬁve years after the
acquisition.
Non-executive directorships
held before the
acquisition
Number of non-executive directorships held by the non-executive in year −1.
Performance measures
Announcement effect This market-based measure of acquirer performance is based on daily data and the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). It is deﬁned as the cumulative abnormal returns for days −1 to +1, where day 0 is
the day of the acquisition announcement. The parameters of the CAPM are estimated over the
period covering days −290 to −40. The good (bad) acquisition performance dummy for
ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT is set to one if the latter is positive (negative), and zero otherwise.
Five-year CAR This market-based measure of acquirer performance is based on monthly data and the Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. It is calculated as the cumulative abnormal
returns from months 1 to 60, where month 0 is the month of the acquisition announcement. The
parameters of the four-factor model are estimated over the period ranging from months −66 to −6.
The good (bad) acquisition dummy for FIVE-YEAR CAR is equal to one if the latter is positive
(negative), and zero otherwise.
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Variable Deﬁnition
Dividend changes This is a dividend-based measure of acquirer performance. DIVIDEND INCREASES is a dummy
variable that is set to one if there has been at least one increase in the acquirer’s dividends with no
cuts or omissions between years 1 and 5, and zero otherwise. The dummy DIVIDEND CUTS OR
OMISSIONS equals one if there is at least one dividend cut or omission between years 1 and 5, and
zero otherwise.
ROA This accounting-based measure of acquirer performance is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes
and depreciation divided by total assets and it is industry-adjusted by subtracting from each annual
observation the mean industry performance using the three-digit SIC codes from Datastream. We
transform the latter into good and bad acquisition performance dummies. These dummies are set to
one if the average of the acquirer performance is positive and negative, respectively, between years 1
and 5, and set to zero otherwise.
ROE This accounting-based measure of acquirer performance is calculated as earnings after interest and tax
divided by common equity and it is industry-adjusted by subtracting from each annual observation
the mean industry performance using the three-digit SIC codes from Datastream. We transform the
latter into good and bad acquisition performance dummies. These dummies are set to one if the
average of the acquirer’s performance is positive and negative, respectively, between years 1 and 5,
and set to zero otherwise.
Cash ﬂow/total assets This accounting-based measure of acquirer performance is calculated as the pre-depreciation proﬁt
divided by total assets and it is industry-adjusted by subtracting from each annual observation the
mean industry performance using the three-digit SIC codes from Datastream. We transform the
latter into good and bad acquisition performance dummies. These dummies are set to one if the
average of the acquirer’s performance is positive and negative, respectively, between years 1 and 5,
and set to zero otherwise.
DPS Dividends per share in the respective year.
EPS Earnings per share in the respective year.
Non-executive characteristics
Tenure The number of years the non-executive has served on the board of the acquirer at the completion of the
acquisition.
Age dummy This is a dummy variable that equals one if the age of the non-executive at the completion date of the
acquisition is 60 or more, and zero otherwise.
Chair dummy This is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the non-executive is the chair of the board in year
0, and zero otherwise.
Non-executive ownership The proportion of the acquirer’s equity held by the non-executive in year 0.
CEO characteristics
CEO ownership The proportion of the acquirer’s equity held by the CEO in year 0.
Duality This is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO is the chair of the acquirer’s board in year
0, and zero otherwise.
Acquirer and acquisition characteristics
Institutional ownership The proportion of the acquirer’s equity held by UK institutional investors in excess of 3% in year 0.
The latter include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts,
investment offices and ﬁrms providing investment advice.
Proportion of
non-executives on board
The number of non-executives on the board of the acquirer divided by the total number of directors on
the board in year 0.
Debt-to-equity ratio Total debt measured as a percentage of common equity of the acquirer in year 0, industry-adjusted by
subtracting from each annual observation the mean industry debt-to-equity ratio calculated using
the three-digit SIC codes. It is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Ln(market value) Natural logarithm of the year-end share price multiplied by the number of total shares outstanding in
year 0.
Relative size The market value of the target expressed as the proportion of the market value of the acquirer 40 days
prior to the acquisition announcement date.
Premium The difference between the offer price and the target share price one day before the effective date of the
acquisition divided by the target share price one day before the acquisition.
Cash dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition is ﬁnanced by cash only, and zero otherwise.
Stock dummy A dummy variable which is set to one if stock only is used to pay for the acquisition, and zero otherwise.
Divestment dummy A dummy variable which equals one if there is at least one reduction of 25% or greater in total assets of
the acquirer from years 1 to 5, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable accounts for the fact that
bad deals are often divested.
Industry dummies Based on the Fama and French 10 industry portfolio classiﬁcation (see http://ow.ly/ypra309kuVZ).
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